to the authority of the late Karl Pearson, to his famous book *The Grammar of Science,* and to his attempt to show that the conception of causation must be replaced by that of correlation. Now, Pearson was primarily a lawyer and a statistician, and his attempt was of a kind that may seem promising to minds exercised only in the highly abstract operations of mathematics. But many men of science regard this attempt and other allied attempts to repudiate causation and explanation in favour of description and correlation as utterly mistaken. As I am one of these, I put the argument in my own way, as follows.

It is clear that science cannot be content with mere description of concrete phenomena and processes. Accurate description is the foundation of all natural science; but, for the purpose of stating correlations, we must assume far more than is given in the mere observation and description of concrete phenomena. We must assume a certain constancy and uniformity in things. For correlation is a statistical conception, implying the assumption of continued self-identity of nature of the unit-objects concerned, and a close similarity of nature between all the members of any recognized class of things, We cannot use language for the purposes of description without making this assumption. When we talk about atoms, or electrons, or molecules, or quartz crystals, or amoeba, or penguins, or men, and describe them and their behaviour, we always and inevitably use words having general and class and abstract

meanings,
words which imply enduring realities of some
sort behind
the appearances of colour and shape and
position and
movement, etc., which are all that we
immediately per-
ceive, and which in a purely and strictly
descriptive